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 This study investigates the structures of civic networks and their roles in steering the 
political choices of party and union elites regarding the retrenchment or expansion of welfare 
states in four recently democratized developing countries. Utilizing co-affiliation networks built 
upon two waves of World Values Surveys and evidence from comparative case studies for 
Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, the study develops two explanatory factors that 
account for variations in welfare politics: cohesiveness and embeddedness. In Argentina and, to a 
lesser degree in Taiwan, party and union leaders‟ cohesive relationships, being disarticulated 
from the informal civic sphere, allowed them to conduct elite-driven social policy reforms from 
above, by launching radical neo-liberal reforms (Argentina) or by developing a generous 
transfer-centered welfare state (Taiwan). In Brazil and South Korea, however, party and union 
leaders‟ durable solidarity embedded in wider civic communities enabled them to resist the 
retrenchment of welfare states (Brazil) or implement universal social policies (South Korea) 
based on bottom-up mobilization of welfare demands. This study demonstrates that elites in the 
formal sector make markedly different political choices when confronting economic crisis and 







 After the third wave of democratization, many developing countries under authoritarian 
governments experienced transitions to democratic regimes. Responding to citizens‟ demands for 
redistribution through the provision of social welfare arose as one of the most important political 
agendas for leaders of political parties and other formal organizations, such as labor unions, in 
many „democratized‟ developing countries. In addition, accelerated economic globalization in 
the late twentieth century has driven leaders and citizens of new democracies to increasingly 
vulnerable positions vis-à-vis economic crises, shocks and fluctuations of world markets.  
 However, political elites in the new democracies, just as in developed countries, have 
shown markedly different responses to these pressures from below and outside. Some countries 
have enjoyed dramatic expansion of welfare states, while other countries have suffered radical 
retrenchments of the public sector. What factors account for these strikingly different trajectories 
of social policy development in emerging economies with newly institutionalized democracy?  
 In order to answer this question, this study focuses on four country cases in this study: 
Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. I intentionally chose these four cases for the three 
following reasons. First, all four countries share similar conditions that facilitate intriguing cross-
national, comparative-historical comparisons. They have achieved medium (Argentina and 
Brazil) to upper (South Korea and Taiwan) mid-levels of developmental stages, and thus social 
demands for public provisions of welfare have emerged in functional, demographic, and political 
contexts, and thus in turn, the expansion or retrenchment of social policies has become a critical 
battleground in formal politics. In addition, all four countries experienced democratization in the 
1980s, and have subsequently consolidated democratic political institutions in the 1990s and the 
2000s. Significantly, all four countries have suffered economic crises in the late twentieth 
century: the two Latin American cases have had endemic and chronic debt crises and extremely 
 
 
high inflation, which were exacerbated in the 1980s and 1990s (see appendix A for concrete 
statistics), while the two other East Asian cases suffered Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 
subsequent recessions, if to different degrees. These similarities allow us to control for some 
alternative economic, political, and structural factors that might otherwise account for variations 
in the dynamics of welfare states among these countries.  
Second, I intentionally chose two East Asian and two Latin-American countries with 
similar cultural and geo-political histories. In this way, I can readily control for several known or 
unknown region-specific factors. Taiwan and South Korea share very similar modern histories 
such as colonization by Japan; American military occupation followed by the Cold War and 
ensuing ideological confrontation; rapid state-led, export-oriented economic development under 
authoritarian regimes; and strong Confucian culture. Argentina and Brazil also share similar 
geographical and cultural similarities such as Catholic-dominant religious identities, as well as 
highly unequal and volatile economic structures; traditions of populist politics; and pronounced 
influence of landed aristocracy and international capital.  
Finally, despite their similarities, these four developing countries have considerable, and 
potentially quite illuminating, diversity in their histories of social welfare regimes. First, the 
development and retrenchment of welfare states in Argentina and Brazil provide intriguing cases 
for comparison. These two countries have followed sharply different trajectories of social, 
political, and economic transformations in the 1990s and 2000s, as shown in Table 1. While 
Argentina has embraced neo-liberal market reforms on public sector and social policies after 
serious debt crisis, Brazil has not adopted them wholeheartedly. Argentina has launched a 
relatively radical privatization of pensions, cut the public share in total health spending, and then 
decreased benefits in family allowances. However, Brazil has not only durably resisted market-
 
 
oriented reforms of key social policy areas such as pension, but also dramatically increased 
government spending for total health care expenditure. Overall, Brazil has delivered to the world 
successful stories of escape from economic crisis, rapid growth rates, preservation of existing 
public sector, and impressive reduction in poverty rates.  
The recent development stories of welfare states in South Korea and Taiwan are no less 
intriguing. As Table 1 shows, during the course of democratic consolidations both countries have 
introduced not only universal health care and national pension programs but also basic old-age 
pension and long-term care insurance mainly targeting the disabled and the old age population 
under the poverty line (basic income and pension) or of middle-class origin (long-term care 
insurance). In addition, both countries introduced government-guaranteed basic income as a 
social assistance program. However, even if these two countries share many pre-existing 
conditions and commonly operating causal forces, such as the growth of influential pro-welfare 
civil society groups, there is also a growing and significant difference in their provisions for 
social policies. On spending side, Taiwan has increased its overall social expenditure level faster 
than South Korea, thanks to its generous income maintenance policies, mainly in the form of 
direct cash transfer programs (see family allowance/social assistance in Table 1). On the 
institutional side, however, South Korea has succeeded in launching more universal types of 
programs with greater potential to increase spending in the future.
1
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 This study focuses more on the institutional expansion or retrenchment of major social programs (especially public 
pension and health care) as an dependent variable, rather than the size of public expenditure on those programs, a 
conventional measure of welfare state efforts, for the following reason: the effects of a universal social policy, e.g. 
pension, on spending measure are realized over a long span of time. Therefore, a significant policy change as an 
outcome of political struggles or economic conditions does not lead to an immediate increase in spending measure. 
As this study analyzes the mechanism of social policy change for relatively a short time period (the 1990s and the 
2000s), it is important to consider the expansion or retrenchment of major social policies as a qualitative outcome. 
Among major social policy areas, this study puts primary focus on income maintenance policies such as old-age 
pension and social assistance programs. 
 
 
These differences between Argentina and Brazil, and between Taiwan and Korea, 
become even more puzzling, given that the major retrenchment in Argentina was propelled by a 
labor-based party, the PJ (the Justicialist Party), while the implementation and expansion of key 
social policies in Taiwan were driven by the right-wing (semi-authoritarian) party, the KMT (the 
Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party). Why did a formerly labor-based party suddenly 
betray the poor and working class in Argentina, but not in Brazil? Why did the right-wing 
(formerly) authoritarian party initiate the expansion of key social policies in Taiwan? But why 
are universal social policies increasingly gaining popular support in South Korea, deepening 
traditional right vs. left-wing partisan confrontations along the line of targeted vs. universal 
policies, while in Taiwan, politicians have been jockeying for the provisions of more generous 
cash transfer programs, regardless of partisanships?  
 In reviewing the theories of welfare states that have been developed to account for 
advanced industrial democracies, I find that existing representative theories of welfare state 
development still have some explanatory power for variations among these countries, but do not 
fully answer the questions I raised. The most commonly cited explanations of welfare state 
expansion—demographic pressure (increasing old age population) coupled with the logics of 
industrialism
2
 and theory of economic openness
3—may reasonably explain the introduction of 
universal health care in Taiwan and South Korea, but cannot explain further why the two 
countries have increasingly followed different paths since the late 1990s. Both theories also have 
limitations in explaining different trajectories of welfare states in Argentina and Brazil, as they 
have similar openness levels and demographic structures. A „state-centric‟ approach,4 as another 
influential theory of welfare state development, may effectively explain earlier phases of partial, 
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 Wilensky 1975; Pampel and Williamson 1988. 
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selective social policy developments (targeting state officials and public sector employees) 
initiated by authoritarian regimes in these countries, but both the role of bureaucrats and the 
legacies of past policies, which were largely identical in two East Asian and two Latin American 
countries, respectively, are not likely to give an adequate answer to the questions above 
regarding „radical departures‟ of social policies from the previous trajectories. The power-
resource theory school
5
 also has a limited ability to account for the variations, as the 
organizational power resources of labor-based reformist parties and unions were largely similar 
in the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil. Even if South Korean labor movements have been known 
to be stronger in their mobilization capacity than their Taiwanese counterparts, labor itself did 
not play a significant role in the expansion of universal social policies in South Korea.  
 In this study, I propose an analytical model in line with „the configuration of civil 
society‟ argument earlier introduced by Ruschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 6and Collier and 
Collier.
7
 This configuration of civil society argument was originally developed to explain 
democratization, but has turned out to have significant implications for welfare state 
development in the global periphery.
8
 Strong civil society not only tames the state under former 
authoritarian legacies by installing democratic norms, rules, conventions, and personnel, but also 
provides more favorable environments for the self-organization and mobilization of the 
subordinate class. As a universal welfare state requires “community-based solidarity (the moral 
economy)” to “scale up” to “societal solidarity (the public moral economy),”9 it is necessary to 
have both democratic strong states and densely developed civil society at the same time in order 
to build a social democratic welfare state in an ideal sense. The explanatory model of this study 
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starts exactly from this point: what if the scaling-up channeling efforts of community-based 
solidarity to the political arena is disconnected somewhere, or disjointed by some structural 
reasons? What if influential political, civic, and economic elites maintain their own nexus, but 
are disarticulated from the community-based solidarity? Would their strategic choices be still 
guided by the principle of the moral economy or by some other factor or interest? 
 In order to answer these questions, under this configuration of civil society tradition, I 
bring in two less-explored or unexplored factors in accounting for the development or 
retrenchment of welfare states in developing countries: cohesiveness of formal-sector 
organizations including inter-class solidarity between the working class and other classes such as 
urban middle classes (coalition among labor-related organizational units), and the embeddedness 
of formal-sector organizations in informal civic sphere. I propose that differently shaped 
coalitions and inter-organizational structures among political parties, labor unions and wider civil 
society formulate divergent welfare regimes and variations in welfare generosity in the four 
developing countries.  In discussing positive cases, namely Brazil and South Korea, I highlight 
the importance of the social embeddedness of formal politics in promoting welfare states. In 
discussing a negative case (Argentina) and a more moderate case (Taiwan) I explore how leaders 
of formal organizations disarticulated from civil society eventually pursue the radical 
retrenchment or the unexpected expansion of welfare states for their own survival. 
 I initially build a theoretical framework that proposes the notions of embedded 
cohesiveness and disarticulated cohesiveness, and their roles in accounting for variations in the 
politics of expansion and retrenchment of welfare states in four developing societies. Utilizing 
network analysis of co-membership data,
10
 I explore the associational structures of these four 
countries and eventually build a causal framework to explain the effects of organizational 
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configurations of formal and informal civic spheres on politics of welfare states. Detailed 
comparative/historical case studies in combination with the results from formal network analysis, 
which I label as „network-informed case studies,‟ will jointly account for the politics of social 
protection in four recently democratized developing countries. 
  
The Cohesiveness of a Labor-based Formal Sector and Welfare Politics 
 This study focuses on the role of formal organizations, especially their inter-
organizational ties and linkages to larger informal civic networks, in the development of welfare 
states. It distinguishes the „formal institutional sphere‟ from the „informal civic sphere.‟ „Formal 
institutional sphere‟ includes political parties, labor unions, and professional associations, each 
of which plays distinctive roles in channeling group interests in the form of formulating and 
negotiating policy agendas as well as electoral bargaining. These associations are formal 
organizations, in the sense that they have established bureaucratic structures in which 
organizational goals, tasks, and agendas are formally codified in core members‟ routines, 
activities, and their interactions with outside worlds. Institutionalization of organizational 
routines are internally stipulated as each organization‟s rules and externally governed by laws.11 
 Informal civic organizations include churches and cultural activity groups such as 
singing groups, book clubs, charity associations, and sports clubs. They are the most informal, 
non (or not-yet)-politicized, relatively ideology-free or interest-free spaces between the state and 
family (or individuals). They are the most distant civic space from modern bureaucratized state 
institutions and interest-based organizations, but the closest to informal, private, local 
community and family lives. Putnam
12
 hoped to preserve this space against modernization and 
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urbanization as the last resort for fostering citizens‟ civic and political efficacy. Habermas also 
claimed that „lifeworld‟ embracing this informal civic sphere as a reservoir of communicative 
reasons should be defended against the colonizing power of modern bureaucratic systems.
13
  
 --------------------------------- Figure 1 about here ----------------------------------- 
 Figure 1 displays the specific organizational linkages (solid lines) involving the 
cohesiveness of the formal sector. I initially define the „cohesiveness‟ of the formal civic sphere 
as the organizational linkages among the three key formal organizations.
14
 First, the linkage 
between political parties and labor unions represents traditional social democratic, labor-based 
power resources.
15
 The linkage “articulates class interests and mobilize members into (collective) 
political action.”16 As this linkage becomes stronger, the working classes‟ demands for 
protection of their income and jobs will be more effectively channeled through party structures. 
In other words, unions‟ approval or disapproval is essential for the legislative passage of specific 
social-policy reform programs (either expansion or retrenchment). 
 Second, the linkage between labor unions and professional associations represents 
cross-class organizational coalitions between the working and the middle classes. There are 
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 Habermas 1984, 1987. Classifying new social movement associations such as environmental or human rights 
groups into any of these two types is ambiguous, because they often intrude into the realms of formal sphere for 
promoting their agendas using divergent repertoires from protesting to lobbying (Habermas himself recognized that 
new social movements emerge exactly between the system and lifeworld). As environmental associations have 
rarely advanced to the status of formal political stakeholders such as unions and parties in developing countries, 
however, we initially classify them as informal civic organizations. In empirical analyses, we also attempted to 
classify them the other way (as formal sector organizations), but different classifications of these NSMs didn‟t 
change the results reported in the main text.  
14
 The measure of cohesiveness is calculated as follows:  
Cohesiveness of Formal Organizational Sphere = ∑(CM i,j) / M(min)u,pa, pr  
(i ≠ j, i,j = any of formal organizations)    
Where the numerator denotes the sum of all comemberships among three formal organizations, political parties, 
unions, and professional associations, and the denominator, M(min)u,pa, pr, denotes membership count of three key 
formal organizations, excluding any redundant memberships. I decided to give equal weights to the three linkages 
among the three organizations, but tables 3 and 4 report and discuss party and union‟s cohesiveness (and 
embeddedness) separately in greater details. See Appendix B for further explanations regarding the measurement of 
interorganizational ties in a comembership matrix. 
15
 Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985. 
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 Huber and Stephens 2001, 18. 
 
 
many historical incidences and theories demonstrating that the strong working- and middle-class 
coalitions are more conducive to the implementation and sustenance of universal social policies. 
Historically, coalition-building was a main driving force of welfare state development. The 
celebrated social democratic welfare states were indeed built upon the cross-class political 
alliance between working-class movements and farmer organizations.
17
 As the new middle 
classes emerge in post-industrial economy, Nordic social democracy has anchored its political 
base on a new coalition between the working classes and the emerging middle classes. Often, the 
middle-class segments of the population play critical roles in creating social democracy and 
universal welfare states.
18
 The most stable and successful welfare programs were the ones that 
served the middle classes‟ interests. In other words, creating political coalitions that embrace not 
only the demands of the needy and the poor, but also the demands of the middle classes for 
insuring themselves from certain risks, will be the most effective strategy for building universal 
welfare states. In such societies with stronger linkages between unions and professional 
associations, the middle classes are likely to be more sympathetic with the idea of pursuing and 
defending universal social policies. 
 Finally, even though it is unclear whether linkages between middle-class oriented 
professional associations and political parties necessarily defend or promote „universal‟ social 
policies, professional organizations in advanced industrial democracies have historically played 
positive roles in claiming welfare state benefits for the middle classes and in defending 
professional interests in the provision of welfare state services.
19
 In addition, some professional 
associations, such as lawyers and professors, have played significant roles in introducing social 
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policies in some developing countries (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) by formulating advocacy 
coalitions for the legislation of specific social policies.
20
 
 In sum, the labor-based organizational ties among these three formal organizations 
summarize a society‟s general capacity to represent the institutionalized channeling processes of 
class-based interests into political arenas. I initially concur with the former power-resource and 
coalition-building approach to the welfare states in my conceptualization of cohesiveness of 
formal sector, but this study also develops a different argument from the conventional power-
resource theory by taking into account the „social embeddedness‟21 of formal politics. In 
developing countries in which there exists a larger segment of the rural and urban poor in the 
informal sector, and in which the size of organized working class is much smaller than in 
advanced industrial economies, the politics of cohesiveness along the lines of trade unions and 
political parties do not always function for the development of universal welfare states. Rather, 
they often end up with populist corporatism through co-optation of the working class by populist 
elites.
22
 Without embeddedness of those formal organizations in wider civil society, unbridled 
formal organizations and their leaders may operate on their own, for their own survival and 
interests.  
  
Social Embeddedness of Formal-sector organizations and Welfare Politics 
 In this section, I contend that the capacity of social policy formulation of a labor-based 
formal sector is based not only on its cohesiveness but also on its degree of „embeddedness‟23 in 
the informal civic sphere (see dashed lines between three formal and five informal civic 
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organizations in Figure 1).
24
 I propose that the embeddedness of a specific formal organizational 
structure in the informal civic sphere addresses two fundamental issues in democratic class 
mobilization: first, in societies in which formal interest bargaining structure is closely connected 
to informal civic lives, citizens will build stronger „trust‟25 with formal-sector organizations in 
charge of interest channeling and bargaining. Second, in those countries with stronger 
organizational linkages between formal and informal civic associations, politicians will be more 
faithfully responsive to their constituents‟ demands for maintaining or expanding universal social 
protection, as they not only become more worried about potential punishment by voters in future 
electoral cycles, but also become increasingly engaged in the informal deliberation of a specific 
policy in the sea of public opinions. Conversely, in societies with weak organizational and 
institutionalized connections between formal and informal spheres, neither parties nor unions are 
committed to sponsoring their deeper electoral or organizational bases, and thus they may, if 
necessary, determine to cultivate new constituencies for electoral survival. 
 The first argument is based on the long-tradition of sociological literature concerning 
the importance of social relations in the creation of economic trust,
26
 but redirects its focus on 
the role of social relations in formulating political trust between voters and formal organizations 
(or their leaders) and building/retrenching welfare states. 
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 The measure of embeddedness is calculated as follows:  
Embeddedness of Formal Sphere = ∑(CM i,k) / M(min)u,pa, pr   
( i ≠ k, i = any of formal organizations, and k = any of non-formal civic associations) 
Where the numerator denotes the sum of all comembership counts between formal organizations and informal civic 
associations. Informal civic associations (k) include church, cultural clubs, environmental associations, sport clubs, 
and charity clubs. Refer to Appendix B for detailed explanations of the measurement of cohesiveness and 
embeddedness of formal organizational sphere. 
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 Provided that “trust consists of placing valued outcomes at risk of other‟s malfeasance, 
mistakes, or failures”,27 I may conceive of organizational linkages between voters in informal 
sectors and leaders in formal organizations as representative of the strength of political trust 
between them. Voters take the risk of supporting their representatives in these formal 
organizations without the guarantee of benefits through generous social protection. They are 
indeed at risk of being ignored after every electoral cycle. Leaders of those formal sectors, 
especially party and union leaders, are also at risk of losing votes even after they have provided 
what they promised to their constituents. Voters may not be tolerant enough to wait for the 
visible effects of social policy implementation, the effects of which are visible primarily in the 
long term, while electoral and membership dues are apparent in the short term. Voters may 
switch their supports to competitors with similar, but seemingly more attractive repertoires of 
policies (e.g. direct cash transfers rather than institutional insurance programs). Therefore, both 
voters‟ support and policy delivery by leaders of formal organizations increase one‟s 
vulnerability to the other, as one party‟s behavior is potentially „not under control‟28 by the other.  
 Under this circumstance, voters‟ actions will be based upon the preference for 
organizations and leaders whose reputation they have known from their own experiences with 
them, or from indirect referrals obtained through relevant networks. When citizens are better 
connected with leaders of the formal-sector organizations, they will be exposed to a higher 
volume of information exchanges and will therefore construct a more correct assessment of the 
trustworthiness, reliability, effectiveness, and relevance of organizational leaders and their policy 
platforms. I generally assume that prolonged interorganizational ties over time will facilitate not 
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only these information exchanges and assessments, but also eventual trust of leaders (insofar as 
those who have sacrificed trust based on information exchanges would sever ties).
29
 
 The second argument is built upon this trust relationship between leaders of formal 
organizations and citizens occupying both the formal and informal civic spheres. It emphasizes 
the role of social relations in constraining and limiting formal politics: it not only allows a 
partisan formal sector based on labor to push forward more progressive egalitarian agendas in 
welfare politics, but also sets a limit on its retrenchment attempts in periods of economic crisis. 
On one hand, the labor-based formal sector deeply embedded in informal sectors is 
representative of participatory institutional politics. Those labor-based party or union leaders 
anchored in informal civic associations are more likely to have initially evolved from 
(Tocquevillian) local community as community organizers, who are distinctive from labor 
aristocracy and machine politicians. Their collective identities are more likely to originate from 
residential neighborhoods, as exemplified by the community-based mobilization of the 1871 
Paris Commune.
30
 They are more likely to care about the general interests of people of diverse 
class origins with whom they have interacted in local churches, cultural and sport clubs, and 
town hall meetings. Therefore, embedded formal-sector leaders are more likely to employ 
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 I am aware that there exist a considerable amount of literature in which this political leader-voter relationship is 
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policies that will enhance their „social legitimacy‟31 and build „social solidarity‟ by serving a 
wide range of social forces.   
The embeddedness of the formal sector in the informal sector may also represent the 
degree or strength of cognitive „social learning‟ processes by which political actors reach the 
„resolution of competing claims‟ through the exchange of ideas and perceptions.32 The 
aforementioned „information exchange‟ and „assessment of trustworthiness of leaders‟ platforms‟ 
are more likely to abound in the intersections of formal and informal civic sectors. Formal-sector 
leaders embedded in informal civic spheres, therefore, will have greater chances to formulate 
public opinions, discussions, debates, and further to craft negotiations and pre-bargaining at 
these intersections of the formal and informal civic spheres. Therefore, formal-sector leaders 
with high embeddednesss are likely representative of already negotiated interests and opinions as 
a form of civic consensus, and are thus able to channel universal and „programmatic‟33 voices in 
political arenas. Or, alternatively, embedded formal-sector leaders are likely to learn how to 
articulate interests and opinions of different social origins, and then actively to mobilize and 
convey them into political arenas, utilizing their unique structural positions as „brokers‟34 
between the formal and informal civic sectors. Acoordingly, embedded formal-sector leaders, as 
more democratic and programmatic brokers, are more likely to hold and implement greater 
political skills by which wide ranges of social forces can formulate „cross-class alliances.‟ 
In addition, embedded formal-sector leaders will resist and challenge the strategic 
decisions of charismatic or technocratic formal-sector leader. Even when confronting national 
debt or financial crises, they will not dare to pursue radical market-oriented reform of existing 
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social welfare, because embedded leaders may be concerned about the detrimental effects which 
radical neo-liberal reforms may exert not only on their core constituencies, but also on 
surrounding communities. Instead, they may seek a moderate reform for minimum-level survival 
in international markets combined with another generous package of social protection for the 
most vulnerable during the course of the reform project. Because of their origins in local 
communities and on-going ties and trust with them, they may be able to persuade grassroots civil 
societies to tolerate reforms necessary for the survival of the entire nation in the global market 
(not merely their own survival), and simultaneously remain as community-based institutions by 
taking care of those who are most vulnerable to structural reforms.  
However, formal-sector leaders who do not have to be concerned about preexisting 
attachment to the informal civic sphere may be freer to take the risk of implementing more 
radical market-oriented reforms, at the cost of losing the existing constituency, but with the 
expected benefits of gaining new constituencies. The formal-sector leaders without connections 
to informal sectors may have neither institutional nor ideological commitments to their old 
constituency, the poor, the working class, and some liberal segments of the middle class.They 
will then be concerned more about their own survival in election than about the welfare of the 
people they have represented. In other words, without organizational linkages embedded in local 
community, both unions and political parties may utilize their cohesive linkages for transforming 
themselves for the survival of organizations (and their leadership).  Formal-sector leaders may 
abandon their traditional electoral base regardless of political ideologies. The formal-sector 
leaders with traditional right-wing tendency but without solid embeddedness in the informal 
civic sphere could resort to left-wing populist mobilization strategies for their survival, while 
 
 
those with a left-wing tendency in the past might suddenly employ radical market-oriented 
reforms of the public sector, as both of them discount the cost of losing traditional bases.  
 --------------------------------- Figure 2 about here ----------------------------------- 
Figure 2 summarizes the arguments I made along with two explanatory factors, the 
cohesiveness and the embeddedness of formal organizational sector.
35
 When the formal-sector 
organizations are disarticulated from the informal civic sphere, incumbent party leaders may 
boldly attempt to adopt reform projects developed by other parties or opposite platforms, as 
shown in the combination of strong cohesiveness and weak embeddedness. This opportunistic 
strategy is deemed realistic when party leaders assume that constituents of other political camps 
are not loyal to their opponents (or other political camps are not cohesive and strong enough to 
retain their constituents), perceive that new policy platforms could obtain more votes than their 
past platform, and finally, find that their ideological commitments to their traditional electoral 
base are out of date, due to industrial and occupational transformation,
36
 and therefore non-
essential for their survival.  
 However, when the leaders of the (labor-based) formal sector are closely linked to each 
other and simultaneously deeply embedded in the civic activities of the local community, they 
will consciously channel a wide range of demands of the working and middle classes into the 
political bargaining tables among formal-sector organizations, and promote more universal and 
programmatic social policies to sponsor broader communities as well as their constituents. In the 
same vein, leaders of the (labor-based) formal sector with strong cohesiveness and 
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embeddedness will vehemently resist the pressures of neo-liberal reform agendas from right-
wing parties, government technocrats, and foreign agencies such as IMF and World Bank. 
 
Case Studies I: Argentina vs. Brazil 
 Argentina is an emblematic case of relatively strong cohesiveness and weak 
embeddedness of the formal sector. The President Carlos Menem‟s radical neo-liberal reform of 
public sector and social welfare programs, especially pension, in the 1990s, along with a striking 
transformation of the PJ (the Justicialist Party), led to a huge political and electoral success. 
Menem‟s reform strategy fundamentally transformed Argentine economy from a protected 
market with a large public sector to a more market-oriented open economy. Menem and the PJ‟s 
neo-liberal reform projects of the public sector were all the more striking because the PJ was a 
representative left-wing, labor-based party that had played a central role in creating the relatively 
generous welfare programs in modern Argentina.
37
 
 ------------------------------ Tables 2 and 3 about here -------------------------------- 
 One central argument of this study is that the relatively strong cohesiveness and weak 
embeddedness of formal-sector associations allowed Menem and the PJ to implement such 
radical neo-liberal reform projects of the public sector. In 1995, about the time when Menem had 
just embarked upon pension reform in the mid 1990s,
38
 labor unions still maintained fairly close 
relationships with political parties, as shown in Table 3. Party‟s linkages with unions and 
professional associations were moderately strong compared to other countries. However, 
political parties‟ linkages to non-formal civic organizations in Argentina were much lower than 
those in other countries in 1995.  
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 The disarticulated formal sector--signified by weak ties between the formal sector and 
the informal civic sphere, in contrast to stable, relatively durable ties within the formal sector--
gave Menem and the PJ sufficient room to cultivate new electoral coalitions around newly 
emerging service sectors and a part of the poor urban sectors that were still loyal to the PJ.
39
 
Some union leaders of the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) also conformed to Menem as 
they remained as the PJ‟s constituents and clients, receiving the rights to create and run their own 
health care programs.
40
 Some unions‟ cohesive support for Menem, his finance technocrats, and 
the PJ played a critical role in the passage of pension privatization in the legislature, although the 
majority of unions remained opposed to the reform drive.
41
  
 As a result of a decade of radical market-based reforms, however, many union 
organizations increasingly cut their ties with the PJ in this process.
42
 In other words, the formerly 
labor-based PJ‟s strong cohesiveness in the formal sector and weak embeddedness in informal 
civic associations eventually weakened its own cohesive ties with traditional allies, unions, in the 
formal sector. This gradual erosion of the PJ‟s organizational base within the formal sector was 
mainly driven by union leaders who could not sustain grass-root level indignation to Menem‟s 
retrenchment drive. Menem‟s technocrats and the PJ legislators kept revising the compromised 
restructuring proposals by cutting (and eventually eliminating) the guaranteed minimum pension 
amount, lowering replacement rates, and setting a upper-bound limit on pension benefits.
43
 
                                                          
39
 See Auyero 1999 for the form and functions of Peronist broker-client networks in urban poor slum.  
40
 Madrid 2003; Murillo 2001. 
41
 Roberts 2006. 
42
 This „reciprocal, feedback effect of neo-liberal reform‟ on cohesiveness suggests that disarticulated cohesiveness 
may not necessarily persist in the long term, and therefore, transformative politics by the PJ were destined to 
oscillate between populist co-optation (of the working class) and neo-liberal reform (targeting the middle class), 
depending upon economic and electoral cycles. Indeed, the PJ reinforced the public component in the pension 
system in 2007 (Brooks 2009) to regain the disenchanted former party base. 
43
 Kay 2000; Haggard and Kaufman 2009. 
 
 
Increasingly more union organizations and members became disenchanted and enraged by 
Menem‟s continued retrenchment moves at times of repeated economic crises.  
 In the end, the PJ‟s radical market reforms based on its cohesiveness led to a 
fundamental dismantling of its traditional mass labor-party structure composed of close inter-
organizational networks between the PJ and labor unions. The long-time traditions of union 
members‟ participation in the PJ‟s political activities and the PJ leaders‟ political careers as 
union members,
44
 and union leaders‟ connections with informal civic sphere, all broke down 
dramatically. As a result, labor unions‟ embeddedness plummeted for a decade, scoring 0.57 in 
2005, the lowest among the four case countries.  
----------------------------------- Table 4 about here ------------------------------------ 
 More specifically, Table 4 shows that, in 1995, 20%  of the PJ members had ties with 
labor unions and professional associations, but in 2005, strikingly, none of the PJ members kept 
ties with other formal-sector associations (0 out of 10), while 36% of non-PJ-party members (5 
out of 14)
45
 were co-affiliated with unions in 2005. In short, after more than a decade of neo-
liberal reform, union leaders and members not only completely cut ties with the PJ, but also lost 
their ties with informal civic associations. One possible explanation of this reduced union 
embeddedness may be that the unions‟ separation from the PJ also led them to lose their 
mediating position between the PJ and informal civic sphere. It is not a coincidence that 
Argentine labor movements, being isolated from both the PJ and civic communities, increasingly 
show segmented, uncontrolled militancy aiming at wage demands at firm or industry level, rather 
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than coordinated electoral demands for social welfare.
46
 These characteristics of Argentine 
formal and informal civic spheres are clearly illustrated in Figure 3-1, in which both union and 
party are sparsely connected to other non-formal civic associations.
47
 
 --------------------------------- Figure 3-1 about here ----------------------------------- 
 To sum up, the departure of a labor-based party from its traditional supporting base, as 
signified by radical retrenchment of state sectors and state-funded social programs could be 
generally attributed to the lack of social embeddedness of Argentine political parties, especially 
the PJ. In addition, this Argentine case illustrates how a loosely linked political organization 
could easily detach itself from formal sector allies as well as its community-based solidarity. The 
transformative move toward market reforms by the PJ in initial alliance with unions eventually 
led to its eventual alienation from its traditional allies, unions, and consequently, a historical 
demise of labor-based social solidarity.  
 --------------------------------- Figure 3-2 about here ----------------------------------- 
 Brazil is the most exemplary case of participatory democracy for the last couple of 
decades, which has recently achieved an impressive record of growth and reduction in poverty. 
Most importantly, in contrast to other countries in Latin America, it has successfully resisted 
market-reform pressures on the public sector and social policies. I argue that the political and 
economic success story of contemporary Brazil could be an outcome of the strong cohesiveness 
and strong embeddedness of the formal sector. Figure 3-2 shows that unions, parties, and 
professional associations are not only densely connected to each other, but also deeply embedded 
in informal civic associations, such as churches, cultural gatherings and clubs, and charity 
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associations. Table 3 shows that labor unions‟ cohesiveness and embeddedness decreased 
slightly from 1995 to 2005, but that political party‟s linkages with formal and informal civic 
associations have been stable with a slight upward trend. Compared to Argentina, union and 
party‟s linkages within the formal sector are not impressively higher, but their connections to 
informal civic lives are vast: Brazilian formal organizations‟ embeddedness in the informal civic 
sphere is roughly 2 to 2.5 times higher than that of the Argentine formal sector (in Table 2).   
 Based on the strong embeddedness of the formal sector in informal civic organizations, 
both center-right party and labor-based party have been relatively committed to the demands of 
the poor and the working classes. Party and union leaders embedded in citizens‟ everyday lives 
through religious and cultural activities are less likely to resort to radical neo-liberal reform paths, 
as their Argentine and other Latin American organizational leaders did.  
 It is important to point out that policy adoption and implementation processes in recent 
Brazil are fundamentally different from the rest of Latin American market reforms. As the PT 
illustrates, many party and union leaders in Brazil originate from local municipal level 
community politics.
48
 As Participatory Budgeting movements in Porto Alegre and other 
Brazilian cities signify,
49
 local community politics at state and municipal levels educate 
participatory publics and leaders, some of whom eventually become the main players for 
national-level politics, as did Lula da Silva. They refused to accept the idea that elite politicians 
mediate and represent the demands of unions or social movements in conventional representative 
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democracy. They desired to eliminate the dichotomy of government vs. movements, and thus to 
build the government from below via social movements. The refusal of dichotomy between 
governments and movements allowed the PT to develop modes of close “organizational 
communication between politicians, party organs, and grassroots organizations.”50 This open 
communication mode initiated by community-oriented party leaders has enabled the PT to 
represent broader social bases beyond labor unions, and indeed led the larger publics of diverse 
class origins to support the labor-based party‟s local and central governance. The PT‟s local and 
central leaders have occupied the „bridging position‟51 between the formal sector and the 
informal civic sphere. Such a structural position based on its social movement origins and 
communal leaderships made it possible for PT municipal and federal candidates to be successful 
not only in electoral politics but also in participatory governance. 
 This grassroot institutional and contentious mobilization of publics and leaders and 
consequential political trust between formal party organs and informal grassroots organizations 
played decisive roles in welfare politics. Under economic pressures (budget and debt crises) 
similar to Argentina‟s, Brazilian political leaders were reluctant to resort to economic 
technocrats. Both Cardoso (1994-2002) and Lula (2002-2010) put the privatization path off the 
table, taking more moderate reform paths by changing entitlement criteria, as the PT and its 
allied civil-society movement activists were staunchly opposed to any privatization plan.
52
 
Eventually, the PT and its allies successfully defended the pension system without radical 
retrenchment. 
 Furthermore, they introduced Bolsa Familia, an innovative cash transfer program 
conditional upon child‟s regular school attendance and participation in vaccination programs, 
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nutrition programs, and vocational training courses,
53
 by unifying several pre-existing schemes 
of family allowance programs.
54
 In a society like Brazil, in which extreme poverty and inequality 
prevails and existing social insurance programs favor workers in the core industries and public 
sectors, implementing an effective social assistance program is as important as defending an 
existing social insurance program. Bolsa Familia has been so effective in fighting poverty that 
the World Bank praised it as the most efficiently targeted CCT scheme in Latin America. The 
universal delivery criteria and performance of the benefits signifies the embedded PT leaders‟ 
commitment to serving the poor in urban and rural informal sector: 73 percent of the benefits are 
delivered to the poorest 20 percent of the population, and 94 percent given to the lowest two 
quintiles.
55
 This Brazilian CCT case is impressively comparable to the Argentine case, in which 
a CCT program has been implemented at a similarly large scale, but the handouts primarily 
delivered to loyal voters through patronage party brokers‟ personalized, clientelistic social 
networks (Calvo and Murillo 2010; De La O 2011), with the result that only 32 percent of the 
handouts reached the poorest 20 percent. In short, Brazilian embedded formal-sector leaders are 
more likely to deliver their social policy benefits to a wider range of constituents beyond existing 
partisan loyalists. 
 Table 2 shows that formal-sector associations in Brazil are not comparable to those in 
other countries in either their sizes or linkages. In 1995, the cohesiveness and embeddedness of 
formal-sector associations were nearly twice as large as those of Argentina. Furthermore, 
Brazilian political parties have maintained a very different structure of organizational linkages 
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with unions and other informal civic organizations, compared to their Argentine counterparts. In 
Table 3, both parties and unions‟ linkages within and outside formal civic sector are the highest 
among four countries in 1995, and the second highest in 2005. In Table 4, both PT and non-PT 
have maintained relatively close linkages to unions within the formal sector.  Compared to 
parties in Argentina, their embeddedness in the informal civic sphere has remained much higher. 
Within Brazil, these differences in the strength of union-party linkages between the PT and non-
PT parties are not noticeably large (0.29 vs. 0.28 in 2005), but the PT moderately increased its 
embeddedness in the wider non-formal civic community (1.46, compared to 1.71). Overall, 
Brazilian party leaders have maintained relatively stable inter-organizational linkages within the 
formal sector and with the informal civic sector, and, despite the pressures from debt and 
balance-of-payment crises, not only resisted neo-liberal market-oriented reform pressures on 
their social insurance system, but also successfully extended their universal poverty alleviation 
program to eligible populations on an unprecedented scale. 
 To summarize, the Brazilian case suggests that the embedded cohesiveness of 
participatory mobilization plays critical roles in deterring and moderating retrenchment pressures 
on social policies under economic crisis. Party and union leaders embedded in social-movement  
and community associations did not choose to bandwagon successful market-oriented reform 
paths in neighboring countries, but carefully created and utilized maneuvering spaces among 
market forces composed of international and domestic capital, labor unions and popular 
movement organizations, constituents with different interests, and other stakeholders.  
 
Case Studies II: Taiwan vs. South Korea 
 
 
 Taiwan and South Korea appear to have followed very similar trajectories in their 
welfare-state development. After the transitions to democracy in the late 1980s, both countries 
achieved the dramatic expansion of their social policy regimes. They not only reshaped health 
insurance to cover nearly the entire population with a unified single pillar system, but also 
introduced many other major social welfare schemes such as unemployment insurance and old 
age allowances in the 1990s and the 2000s. As much previous scholarship points out,
56
 this rapid 
expansion of welfare regimes in two countries is mainly attributable to consolidated democratic 
competitions. 
 However, I contend that the two countries have also developed increasingly different 
structures of civic spheres after the transition to democracy, which have driven them to follow 
increasingly divergent paths of welfare state development, which is not easily detectable on the 
basis of spending measures.
57
 I again focus on the different configurations of formal sectors in 
Taiwan and South Korea, and find that the Taiwanese formal sector becomes increasingly closer 
to the Argentine one, if to a lesser degree, while the structure of the South Korean formal sector 
may be increasingly comparable to the Brazilian one. Yet, in contrast to Latin American 
economies plagued with chronic debt and foreign currency crises accompanied by extremely 
high inflation (see appendix A), East Asian developing countries that have achieved high 
economic growth and sound balance of budget had sufficient degrees of freedom for expanding 
social safety nets even when confronting the economic crises in the late 1990s. When Latin 
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American countries suffered the pressures of the politics of retrenchment across the entire region, 
East Asian countries relished the politics of expansion for social policies. Under these situations, 
formal-sector leaders of Taiwan and South Korea made their own ideological or strategic choices 
regarding social policy expansion. While the South Korean case confirms the validity of the old 
social-democratic power-resource route, Taiwanese case verifies „the politics of disarticulation‟ 
which I proposed earlier in the Argentine case.  
 ----------------------------- Figure 3-3 and 3-4 about here ---------------------------- 
 The connectivity of Taiwanese civic spheres is initially characterized by the weak 
cohesiveness and weak embeddedness of the formal sphere in 1995, even if both dimensions of 
connectivity became somewhat stronger over time. Table 3 shows that both Taiwanese unions‟ 
and parties‟ cohesiveness within the formal sector was the lowest among the four countries in 
1995,  but Taiwanese parties and unions rapidly strengthened their interorganizational ties within 
the formal sector over the course of a decade, while remaining disconnected from the informal 
civic sphere. Figure 3-3 shows that parties in Taiwan have some visible connections with unions, 
but are sparsely connected with other non-formal civic associations. An epitome of disarticulated 
cohesiveness in Taiwanese politics is the conversion of Taiwanese ruling party, the KMT, from 
an anti-welfare conservative force to a pro-welfare centrist party in the mid-1990s.
58
 Confronting 
growing electoral challenges from the opposition party (the DPP), backed up by a coalition of 
civil society groups
59
 advocating ambitious universal health care, pension, and guaranteed 
income policies, the bulk of which rely on direct cash transfers, the KMT eventually employed 
progressive social policy reforms, launching national health insurance in 1995 and 
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unemployment insurance to all workers in 1999, as pre-emptive policy initiatives right before the 
legislative elections in 1996 and 2000. As the DPP prioritized old-age pensions as its main 
platform,
60
 expanding its electoral base to the rural areas, traditional KMT strongholds, the 
mainstream faction of the KMT determined to respond to this electoral challenge by employing 
correspondingly radical pro-welfare reforms. 
 In contrast to Taiwanese social welfare revolution (health care and employment 
insurance) by the conservative government, or compromised solution (pension) between a weak 
reformist government and a strong conservative legislature, nearly all major universal social 
policies in South Korea were introduced by incumbent reformist policy-makers, in alliance with 
strong pro-welfare „advocacy coalitions‟61 from civil society groups.62 The growth of pro-welfare 
civil-society forces in South Korea coincided exactly with the decline of contentious politics and 
the growth of the cohesiveness and embeddedness of formal institutional sphere. After the 
turbulent eruptions of democratization, labor strikes, and diverse social movements in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, South Korean associational fields began in the mid-1990s to experience rapid 
institutionalization of movement organizations and agendas. Both unions and political parties 
suffered sharp declines in their memberships, but simultaneously, key leaders of such formal 
organizations started building close ties with other main actors in formal and informal civic 
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spheres. In Table 2, the membership counts for formal sector decreased significantly,
63
 but in 
Table 3, both leaders of parties and unions dramatically increased their ties within the formal 
sector (0.25 to 0.83 for unions and 0.23 to 1 for parties) and with informal civic organizations 
outside the formal sector (1.13 to 2 for unions and 1 to 2.08 for parties). Parties and unions 
increased their share of personnel resources through co-membership ties, and also become more 
densely connected with community-level informal civic organizations, as illustrated in Figure 3-
4.
64
 In a decade, both the cohesiveness and embeddedness of South Korean formal sector 
surpassed those of Brazil, which was ranked at the top among the four case countries in 1995.   
 In particular, the introduction of government-guaranteed basic income, which is known 
as Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG), is a good example of civil society-driven 
welfare reforms. It is stipulated as a citizen‟s basic right rather than as the state‟s selective 
assistance to the needy. Among civil society groups, the role of People‟s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was decisive in putting national guaranteed income on the table 
during and after the financial crisis. The PSPD formed a strong „advocacy coalition‟ composed 
of 26 influential civic associations including the Korean Federations of Trade Unions (KFTU), 
Citizens‟ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), and the Korean Women‟s Associations United 
(KWAU), and kept putting pressure upon both the ruling reformist party and the opposition 
conservative party for the adoption of a “national minimum living standard” (Kim and Kwon 
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2008, p.232). An important distinction of the PSPD-led advocacy coalitions from other pressure 
groups was that it had allies not only in the ruling party, but also in the government bureaucracy 
and the opposition conservative party. The coalition ignited competitions between two parties by 
promoting a legislative petition allying with a representative of the opposition conservative party, 
while keeping pressures upon allies in the ruling party for actual legislation. After the law was 
proposed, while it was passing through the standing committee of the National Assembly, and 
under intense scrutiny and debate from different ministries within the government for follow-up 
enforcement regulations, the coalition continued to play a significant role in maintaining the 
original spirit and contents in each step of legislation and implementation.
65
  
 The most illustrative example of the difference in the policy-mobilization and crafting 
processes between two countries is the politics of old-age pensions. Taiwan‟s old-age pension 
basically consists of three different sub-systems which can hardly be called a unitary national 
pension scheme: one for state and public sector employees, another for subscribers of established 
firms to pre-existing labor insurance, and another for formerly uncovered populations, mostly 
non-employed, un-employed, and self-employed.
66
 Considering the relatively large public sector 
in Taiwan, this fragmented pension system is less likely to generate effective solidaristic risk-
pooling and redistribution effects. This fragmented structure results in “uneven levels of benefit 
to different segments of the population.”67 The fragmented structure was the product of a 
political compromise between the DPP (the Democratic Progressive party) government and the 
KMT-dominated legislature. On one hand, the KMT wanted neither to endorse the incumbent 
                                                          
65
 The recent emergence of strong pro-welfare alliances beyond policy-making technocrats and professionals (such 
as lawyers, doctors, and professors) in South Korea, and political parties‟ unusually active involvements in discourse 
on universal welfare policies, reflect this growth in the strength of cohesiveness and embeddedness of formal-sector 
organizations.     
66
 The newly added one for the former non-insured does not require any contributions from employers, with an 
insured person‟s flat rate contribution (60%) in combination with government‟s flat rate funding (40%). 
67
 Ramesh 2004, 14. 
 
 
DPP‟s long-held platform, old-age pension, nor to be depicted as an anti-welfare force by being 
opposed to the quasi-cash transfer program for the formerly uninsured in the informal sector. On 
the other hand, without strong support from civil society encompassing both working and middle 
classes, but with strong oppositions from its significant financial supporters (small businesses) 
the incumbent DPP government did not have enough capacity to pass the original universal 
scheme through the hostile legislature. This is how three different pillars of pension schemes 
eventually came to co-exist in a fragmented form under the name of „national pension.‟ The 
KMT‟s two completely different platforms on social welfare depending upon their incumbency 
suggest that its policy orientation is completely based on electoral needs and tactics. 
 However, in South Korea, an old-age pension program was introduced as a single-pillar 
scheme with strong redistributive income transfer components from corporate employees in the 
formal sectors to non- or self-employed citizens in the rural and urban informal sectors. Even 
some segments of labor unions and middle-class NGOs were initially strongly opposed to this 
single-pillar redistributive system, but the newly elected reformist government succeeded in 
implementing the progressive single-pillar scheme with strong support from the more 
progressive elements of unions and civil society groups.  
 In Taiwan, both main parties, the KMT and the DPP, have shown strong interest in 
expanding the social policy regime. Their mutual competitions were initially driven by the DPP‟s 
ambitious cash transfer programs designed to compete with the KMT‟s vote-buying,68 which was 
later matched by the KMT‟s pre-emptive reform initiatives. However, being disarticulated from 
wider civil society, neither party had sufficient capacity to persuade and coordinate its own party 
members as well as different interest groups and social forces to mobilize around a single-pillar 
system. As a result, a large part of Taiwanese social welfare schemes is composed of direct cash 
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transfers targeted toward specific groups, rather than universal programs that embrace different 
segments of populations under a unitary redistributive scheme. Therefore, overall social 
expenditures increased rapidly, but key insurance systems remained fragmented.  
     
Embedded Cohesiveness vs. Disarticulated Cohesiveness 
 In this section, I move beyond comparison within regions. I define the Argentine and 
Taiwanese cases as examples of disarticulated cohesiveness, while classifying the Brazilian and 
South Korean cases under embedded cohesiveness. In this classification across regions, , I 
initially formulate a causal path tree that accounts for divergent outcomes of welfare politics, 
contingent upon the level of cohesiveness and embeddedness, and the partisanship of incumbent 
governments (figure 4). Then, I focus on the structural positions of labor unions in associational 
communities and their consequences for welfare politics in terms of over-time changes for both 
independent and dependent variables (figure 5 and table 5).  
 ---------------------------------- Figure 4 about here --------------------------------- 
 Figure 4 proposes causal pathways using two main explanatory factors and an 
additional variable (partisan incumbency), and expansion or retrenchment outcomes for welfare 
states in four developing countries. All four countries are exposed to initial pressures originating 
from globalization and democratization. Severe financial crisis and fierce political competitions 
(after transition to democracy) put elites and leaders of formal politics in these countries under 
similar pressures, but depending upon their organizational capacity based on various modes of 
linkages, these countries have followed different trajectories.  
 In theory, with low cohesiveness, I would assume that there would be little inter-
organizational capacity to push forward radical reform projects regardless of embeddedness and 
 
 
incumbent partisanship. Therefore, no action will be taken for the rest of the trees.
69
 However, 
depending upon the level of embeddedness, strong cohesiveness would be expected to diverge 
toward different outcomes. With both high embeddedness and high cohesiveness, reformist 
governments inheriting good growth records and sound budget situation will launch 
expansionary programs toward universal welfare states (South Korea). Even in the event that 
they inherit economic crisis (budget, currency or debt crisis) from a previous regime, they would 
not retrench the existing welfare states, as was the case in Brazil. Being surrounded by the 
cohesive formal-sector organizations embedded in supporting civic associations, even right-wing 
or center-right government--such as the Lee regime in recent South Korea (2008-) or the Cardoso 
regime in Brazil (1995-2002)--would not be able to push radical neo-liberal reform programs, 
although neither would launch any new generous welfare programs.  
 ----------------------------- Figure 5 and table 5 about here ------------------------------- 
 Over-time changes of cohesiveness and embeddedness in Figure 5 and Table 5 lend 
credence to this scenario. Figure 5 shows that, with Brazil maintaining its strong case as an 
example of embedded cohesiveness without noticeable changes over time in both cohesiveness 
and embeddedness, South Korean labor unions‟ upward-move in both dimensions towards 
another instance of embedded cohesiveness is impressive. Consequently, while little (or weak 
negative) changes lead to virtually no change in major social policy areas (or moderate 
adjustment) in Brazil, a very strong positive change brings in universal expansion of major social 
policy schemes in S.Korea (see Table 5).
70
 I conceptualize these over-time tendencies not only as 
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a greater incorporation of unions into social democratic politics, but also as a greater engagement 
of unions in community-based informal solidarity. Strong political trust built upon strong 
linkages of unions with other formal-sector associations is deeply embedded in community-
based informal civic lives in these two countries.  
 To sum up, the politics of embedded cohesiveness is associated with a protection of the 
welfare sector even under severe economic crisis, or an ambitious expansion of universal social 
policies under reformist governments. In both Brazil and South Korea, reformist parties or 
progressive civic associations‟ clear commitments to guarantee citizens‟ general welfare and 
living conditions against destructive market competitions were stable (Brazil) or strengthened 
over time (South Korea), and underpinned by the organizational linkages within the formal 
sector and between the formal and informal civic spheres in both countries. The leaders of 
cohesively linked (labor-based) formal organizations, being deeply embedded in the informal 
civic sphere, have been aggressively channeling the demands for more universal and generous 
social protections from the wider class and community bases, including the middle and working 
classes. 
 With the high cohesiveness and low embeddedness path in Figure 4, which I have 
labeled as „disarticulated cohesiveness,‟ partisan governments become non-partisan in the 
traditional sense, as they have room to maneuver strategically depending upon their judgments of 
potential gains by transformative politics. The disarticulated cohesiveness, however, may 
become unstable over time. A labor-based populist party‟s betrayal of its own traditional partner 
(labor, in Argentina), and a former conservative authoritarian party‟s passive revolution through 
pre-emptive welfare enactments (in Taiwan) drove unions to float without apparent political 
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allies in these countries. In Argentina, labor‟s linkages with informal civic associations sharply 
decreased (see Figure 5), as they were alienated from the PJ and therefore lost their mediating 
positions between the PJ and informal civic community. In Taiwan, realignments of labor unions 
with non-traditional allies in Taiwan were accompanied by underdevelopment of ties with 
informal sectors (Taiwan) relative to consolidated union‟s linkages within formal sector (with the 
KMT). As a result, labor unions‟ ratio of linkages with formal to linkages with informal 
associations (column C / column D in Table 3) have dramatically increased in these two 
countries (0.58/1.37 = 0.42 in 1995 to 0.57/0.57 = 1.00 in 2005 in Argentina, and 0.12/0.55 = 
0.22 in 1995 to 0.50/0.68 = 0.74 in 2005 in Taiwan). The relative overgrowth of cohesiveness in 
Taiwan or the dwindling embeddedness in Argentina are not comparable to small changes in 
Brazil (0.65/1.44 = 0.45 to 0.45/1.33 = 0.34) and South Korea (0.25/1.13 = 0.22 to 0.83/2.00 = 
0.42). I define these tendencies of disarticulated cohesiveness not only as a greater incorporation 
(cooptation) of unions into formal-sector machine politics (especially in Taiwan), but also as a 
greater disarticulation of unions from community-based informal solidarity (especially in 
Argentina). The third and last columns of Table 5 illustrate that the disarticulated cohesiveness 
may lead to the cross-partisan moves--neo-liberal retrenchment reform by formerly labor-based 
parties and pre-emptive reform for generous social policies by formerly authoritarian right-wing 
parties  
 Despite the electoral successes of the PJ‟s transformative reform politics in 
Argentina,
71
 with the low cohesiveness and low embeddedness of partisan politics, it is very 
uncertain whether any further transformative politics in Argentina would be able to bring in 
effective reform agendas without relying on either populism or clientelism (or both). Also, given 
that both politicians‟ and electorates‟ preferences for cash transfer programs without more tax 
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revenue have increasingly exacerbated government budget deficits,
72
 it is a precarious question 
to ask whether the Taiwanese welfare state will be able to stand increasing challenges of 
retrenchment pressure in near future. 
       
Conclusion: The Embedded Cohesiveness and the Politics of Social Protection in Global 
Market 
 This study brought the configuration of associational networks into the discussion of 
welfare politics in developing countries, and formulated a concept of „embedded cohesiveness,‟ 
aiming to account for politics of both retrenchment and expansion in welfare state development 
in four developing economies under consolidated democracy. It suggests that developing an 
explanatory model of politics of welfare states in developing countries should go beyond 
traditional theories of welfare states mainly developed on the basis of advanced industrial 
countries. When politics of social protection extend their origins and sources to informal civic 
space and configurations within and outside formal-sector politics beyond narrow phenomena of 
electoral competitions and alliances, the strength of political trust between leaders of formal 
organizations and citizens of informal civic associations, or simply the embeddedness of the 
formal sector, along with cohesiveness, emerge as the significant explanatory factors for 
variations in the politics of social policies in (democratized) developing countries. 
 When an analytical framework is able to focus on this larger, deeper process of political 
trust-building based on inter-organizational ties other than mere political competitions, it can 
effectively account for politics of both expansion and retrenchment in social policies. When 
leaders of the formal sector build entrenched solidarity across different classes and sectors, a 
reformist government facing economic crisis may be able to conduct essential structural reforms 
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based on supportive and trusting constituents who may be more tolerant of indispensable reforms 
necessary for the survival of a country in global market. Or, based on such support, a reformist 
government with a good track record of growth may be able to launch a more ambitious 
universal social policy that extends its coverage to non-traditional supporters. In such a civic 
community, leaders of the formal sector will not be disloyal to their old constituents even at a 
moment of crisis. Even if there might be an opportunity to create new constituents by 
implementing new policies not under their traditional platforms, they would not expediently 
move in such a new direction. They might do so, only under the condition that their old 
constituents would agree to change their existing platforms to respond to new risks and 
challenges from rapidly changing economic and political situations. 
 However, when leaders of the formal sector are not committed to their constituents 
through grassroot-level involvements, they may opt to discard their traditional standpoints and 
ideological commitments, and switch to opposite platforms for their electoral survival. This 
opportunistic gamble, surely, is feasible when severe economic crisis and electoral competitions 
put the leaders in jeopardy of quickly losing grounds in near future. I argued that the politics of 
retrenchment of welfare states by a labor-based party or the politics of expansion of welfare 
states by a conservative party share this common logic of political transformation.  
 The central argument of this study is highly consonant with „the configuration of civil 
society‟ argument promoted by Ruschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens73 and Collier and 
Collier,
74
 and further refines their central tenets. They commonly argued that a well-developed 
civil society is conducive to democracy by providing the working classes with better 
opportunities to increase their organizational power. Recently, and in line with these previous 
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studies, Sandbrook and colleagues
75
 took into account this role of growing civil society as one of 
the key factors that promote social democracy in the global periphery. They make an important 
point that dense civil society not only offers a favorable condition for self-organization for the 
subordinate class, but also “reduces the transaction costs of coordinating interests,” and 
“increases the chances that the better argument will prevail.”(184) The analysis and evidence of 
this study improve these arguments in several aspects. I have not only visually presented the 
divergent configurations of civil society across different societies, but have also provide 
additional causal process using the notion of „embeddedness‟ and „trust‟76 represented by 
organizational ties between the formal and the informal civic associations. While Sandbrook and 
colleagues (rightly) emphasized the emergence of communicative reason (Habermas‟ sense) in 
densely linked civil society, I have focused on the structure of organizational embeddedness in 
civic associational networks, highlighting formal-sector elites‟ strategic choices regarding the 
expansion or retrenchment of public sector, contingent upon their socially embedded trust 
relationships with informal civic spheres. I believe that in future studies, it would be valuable to 
incorporate the communicative, cognitive aspects of civil society and public spheres and the 
organizational, structural aspects of civil society in a single explanatory framework that could 
account for democracy and welfare-state development in developing societies. 
 Many students of welfare state development in developing countries point out that, in 
developing countries, social welfare programs are often devised for the privileged working class 
in the formal sector, excluding a large segment of populations in the urban and rural informal 
sectors.
77
 Trade unions‟ alliances with populist regimes in Latin America made them skeptical 
about the role of labor unions in promoting universal social policies in developing societies. I 
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showed that, in societies in which unions are deeply embedded in informal civic associations, 
labor unions, as a traditional power-resource approach predicts, still play a meaningful role in 
resisting retrenchment or in sponsoring more generous and comprehensive social policies. I 
conclude that unions‟ embeddedness is an essential element to prevent the working class from 
being attracted by populist regime‟s selective co-optation strategy. 
 I also contend that reformist political projects based on embedded cohesiveness are 
relatively intact from the pressures of globalization, which directly refutes the argument that 
globalization foils traditional social democratic projects to build more generous and 
comprehensive welfare states by enervating essential state-centered activities such as higher tax 
and protection of labor rights. The comparative case studies and evidence presented in this study 
show that globalization does not explain variations in the outcome, the (universal) expansion and 
retrenchment of existing welfare states. Argentina and Brazil, sharing similar debt crises and 
long histories of exposure to foreign capital, showed significantly different reactions to common 
structural reform pressures from neo-liberal market forces. In Brazil, both Cardoso and Lula 
regimes were initially constrained by economic crisis, but through their second terms, market-
oriented reform pressure didn‟t lead to the radical transformation of Brazilian social policy 
institutions. Taiwan and South Korea--both sharing export-led industrial structures, similar 
positions in world economy, and high levels of capital openness--showed seemingly similar, but 
somewhat different trajectories of welfare state development. Importantly, globalization itself did 
not frustrate or constrain any efforts of national governments to expand or protect existing 
welfare states with the exception of Argentina. Rather, as the South Korean and Brazilian cases 
illustrate, cohesively embedded reformist leaders utilize the pressures of international market 
 
 
forces as an opportunity to expand existing social welfare schemes to formerly uncovered, 
vulnerable populations.  
 Also, globalization may increase the middle classes‟ demands for more comprehensive 
social insurance systems, as they become increasingly threatened by and vulnerable to higher 
volatility of financial situations. The middle classes in Taiwan and South Korea, who 
increasingly became pro-welfare forces regardless of political partisanship, also support this 
scenario. In a sense, the impacts of globalization on the politics of social protection may be also 
contingent upon the degree and mode of social embeddedness of formal politics. With stronger 
embeddedness, the pressures of globalization may urge leaders of the formal sector to protect or 
expand welfare states to defend their traditional constituents. However, with weak embeddedness, 
globalization may provide disarticulated formal sector leaders not only with incentives, but also 
with justifications to depart from their existing constituents. In short, globalization may 
strengthen partisan loyalty, but may also facilitate complete realignments or prolonged chaotic 
transformative coalitions among politicians or within machine politics regardless of voters‟ 
desires, as can be observed in post-Menem era of Argentina.  
 Recently, there have been many scholarly efforts to explore the conditions and 
prospects of social democracy in the global periphery, as left-wing or center-left governments 
take power after decades of dominance by neo-liberalism in political and economic arenas. I, 
however, intentionally chose country cases that are not yet deemed social democracies. All of the 
cases have just escaped from intense authoritarian regimes with only about two decades for 
peaceful democratic electoral cycles, and are still in the processes of consolidating democratic 
institutions to enhance transparency and accountability. All four cases still have powerful 
coalitions of conservative blocks from authoritarian ancien régimes. The influences of big 
 
 
businesses (S.Korea), agrarian landlord classes and foreign capital (Argentina and Brazil), and 
corrupt machine politics (Taiwan and Argentina) still loom large over the prospects of 
democracy. A key ingredient of social democracy--long-term incumbency of left-wing 
governments
78
--is not yet in near sight in these countries, as even center-left governments‟ 
incumbency is often halted or limited by strong right-wing alliances (S.Korea and Taiwan) or its 
own transformation (Argentina). Nevertheless, I find that exploring these countries under 
democratic consolidation is as fruitful as exploring any other exemplary cases of welfare states, 
because these cases illustrates live examples of struggles for equality through democratic 
competitions. They provide valuable lessons from stories of frustrations from betrayals, lack of 
capacity, strategic mistakes, and continuous hopes for new politics and reforms. I believe that the 
notion of „embedded cohesiveness‟ contributes to the understanding of these divergent stories of 
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Table 1. (Universal/National) Expansion and Retrenchment of Income Maintenance 
Policies in Four Developing Economies, 1990s and 2000s 
 
 Argentina Brazil South Korea Taiwan 
Major Implementation 
 








(progressive allocation to 
municipalities)(2002) 
National Health Insurance 
(2000) 
Long-term care Insurance  
National Health Insurance 
(1995) 






None None National Pension (1999) 
(Single Pillar) 
Basic Old-age Allowance 
(2007)  
National Pension (2008) 
(Fragmented) 
Basic Old-age Allowance 
(2008) 
Family Allowance 








Transfers (Bolsa Familia)c  
Government-guaranteed 
Basic Income (2000)d 
Minimum Living 
Expenses (2008) 
Free Institutional Care to 
Elderly (1993) 
Medical Subsidy to 
Children (2002) 
Child Care Subsidy (2008) 
Major Retrenchment 
 



















& Social Assistance  
Benefits decreased  None None None 
Data Source: Social Security Programs throughout the World (2008 for S.Korea and Taiwan and 2009 for Argentina and Brazil) 
Note a:  previously limited to firms with more than 30 workers 
Note b: previously limited to firms with 5 or more workers 
Note c: Conditional upon children‟s school attendance and vaccination  
















Table 2. Cohesiveness and Embeddedness of Formal Sector in Four Developing Countries: 1995 and 2005 
 
Country Year Total 
N 
N in Formal 
Sector 
(Column A) 




























of Formal  
Sector 
(D/A) 
Argentina 1995 1079 94 312 17 119 0.38 0.29 0.18 1.27 
 2005 1002 62 284 11 60 0.35 0.28 0.18 0.97 
            
Brazil 1995 1149 234 542 93 480 0.68 0.47 0.40 2.05 
 2005 1500 262 943 80 511 0.80 0.63 0.31 1.95 
            
S.Korea 1995 1249 120 432 10 136 0.44 0.35 0.08 1.13 
 2005 1200 45 418 21 111 0.39 0.35 0.47 2.47 
            
Taiwan 1995 780 104 135 9 80 0.31 0.17 0.09 0.77 




Table 3. Unions and Parties’ Interorganizational Ties within and outside Formal Sector in Four Developing Countries: 1995 
and 2005 
 
Country year Party’s Tiesa 
within Formal 
Sector 


















/N of Union 
Members 
(Column D) 
Argentina 1995 0.32 0.85 0.58 1.37 
 2005 0.33 0.63 0.57 0.57 
      
Brazil 1995 0.51 1.46 0.65 1.44 
 2005 0.56 1.53 0.45 1.33 
      
S.Korea 1995 0.23 1.00 0.25 1.13 
 2005 1.00 2.08 0.83 2.00 
      
Taiwan 1995 0.23 0.92 0.12 0.55 
 2005 0.38 0.95 0.50 0.68 
Note a: Party‟s ties include co-membership values (1) between party and union and (2) between party and professional association.  




Table 4. Parties’ Interorganizational Ties with Unions and Informal Civic Sector, by 
Partisanships 
 
Country year Party-Union Ties  
/N of Party Members 
(Column A) 
Party’s Ties outside Formal Civic Sector 
/N of Party Members 
(Column B) 
Argentina 1995 0.20 (PJ) 0.11 (non-PJ) 0.87 (PJ) 0.84 (non-PJ) 
 2005 0 (PJ) 0.36 (non-PJ) 0.50 (PJ) 0.43 (non-PJ) 
      
Brazil 1995 0.41 (PT) 0.21 (non-PT) 1.46 (PT) 1.46 (non-PT) 
 2005 0.29 (PT) 0.28 (non-PT) 1.71 (PT) 1.37 (non-PT) 
      
S.Korea 1995 No Partisanship Information available for S.Korea 
 2005 
      
Taiwan 1995 0.18 (KMT) 0.22 (non-KMT) 0.53 (KMT) 1.67 (non-KMT) 



































Table 5. Over-Time Changes of Cohesiveness, Embeddedness, and Welfare States 
Country Change in Union 
Cohesiveness 
Change in Union 
Embeddedness 
Change in Ratio 
(Cohesiveness 
/Embeddedness) 





in Welfare States 
Argentina Little Strongly Negative Strongly Positive Radical Yes 
 (-.01) (-.80) (.58) Retrenchment  
      
Brazil Weakly Negative Weakly Negative Weakly Negative Moderate  No 
 (-.20) (-.11) (-.11) Adjustment  
      
S.Korea Strongly Positive Strongly Positive Weakly Positive Expansion No 
 (.58) (.87) (.20) (Universal)  
      






































































Formal Sector Organizations 
Inter-organizational Ties within Formal Sector (Ingredients of Cohesiveness) 
Inter-organizational Ties between Formal Sector and Informal Civic Sphere (Ingredients of Embeddedness) 















Figure 2. Combinational Spaces of Cohesiveness and Embeddedness of Formal sector 
 
                          Embeddedness of Formal sector 












Weak Loyalty to Civil Society, but 




Strong Loyalty to Civil Society, but 
Lack of Capacity for Expansion or 
Retrenchment 
(No Reform) 
Weak Loyalty to Civil Society and 
Strong Capacity for Expansion or 
Retrenchment 
(Neo-Liberal Reform  
or Passive Revolution) 
Strong Loyalty to Civil Society and 
Strong Capacity for Channeling of 
Demands from Civil Society 
(Expansion of Universal Welfare 
States) 
Note a: I initially assume that there will be no reform initiative under weak cohesiveness and weak embeddedness, 




































































































































































































Figure 5. Union’s Cohesiveness within Formal sector and Embeddedness in Informal Civic 
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Appendix A. Basic Economic and Demographic Data for Four Countries in the 1990s and 
2000s. 
 Argentina Brazil South Korea Taiwan 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
GDP per capita, PPP($) 9,616 10,819 7724 8505 15761 22783 15067 26657 
Age structure (65 years and over)  10.6  6  8.6  9.6 
Total Debt (Domestic + Foreign)  
(% of GDP) 33.8 70.3 39.6 60.3 10.2 30 12 38.5 




(1994) 7 7 1  2 














Social Expenditure II (% of GDP) 
(Excluding Education, but including 





Note a. Taiwanese social expenditure I includes public spending on education.  
Sources: World Development Indicators (2011). Total debt data are drawn from UNCTAD 2008. Social expenditure I is from ILO 2010/11; 

















Appendix B. Measurement of Cohesiveness and Embeddedness in Associational Networks 
In order to measure the structure of associational communities in four developing 
countries, I utilize data on memberships with voluntary associations in two waves of World 
Values Surveys, 1995 and 2005. Membership questionnaires contained in these two waves 
provide important information by asking whether respondents are active or non-active members 
for a specific association.
79
 The individual-level survey data on memberships with voluntary 
associations allow me to build an analytical map of each national associational community to 
explore “how individuals in a society are affiliated with different types of voluntary 
organizations,” “how these individuals and organizations are connected to each other through co-
memberships,” and “how these affiliation networks are aggregated into a distinctive pattern of 
organizational power structure and configuration”(Lee 2007, 594).  
Then, based on the two mode information (m individuals * n associational types), I built 
an n*n co-affiliation matrix (Breiger 1974; Borgatti et al. 2002) using UCINET 6. The matrix is 
composed of diagonal elements representing the number of membership for each association and 
non-diagonal elements featuring the number of co-memberships between two associational types. 
With this comembership matrix, I calculated the measures of cohesiveness and embeddedness as 
follows. 
Cohesiveness of Formal Organizational Sphere  = ∑(CM i,j) / M(min)u,pa, pr  
(i ≠ j, i,j = any of formal civic associations)    
  = (CM u,pa + CM u,pr + CM pa,pr ) / M(min)u,pa, pr 
 
Where CM u,pa, CM u,pr, and CM pa,pr, denote comembership between unions and parties, 
comembership between union and professional associations, and comembership between parties 
and professional associations, respectively. M(min)u,pa, pr denotes membership count of three key 
formal organizations, excluding any redundant memberships (e.g. even though a respondent is 
co-affiliated with all three associations, only one membership will be recorded for the 
respondent). 
Embeddedness of Formal Organizational Sphere = ∑(CM i,k) / M(min)u,pa, pr   
( i ≠ k, i = any of formal civic associations, and k = any of non-formal civic associations) 
= ∑(CM u,k) + ∑(CM pa,k) + ∑(CM pr,k) / M(min)u,pa, pr   
 
Where the numerator denotes the sum of all comembership counts between formal civic 
associations and informal civic associations. More specifically, the numerator includes the sum 
of comemberships between unions and all informal civic associations (∑(CM u,k)), the sum of 
comemberships between parties and all informal civic associations (∑(CM pa,k)), and the sum of 




                                                          
79
 I only utilize „active members‟ to construct a co-membership matrix among eight associational types (church, 
cultural clubs, labor unions, political parties, professional associations, environmental associations, sport clubs, and 
charity groups) for each country module. I believe that when I use active members, excluding non-active members, I 
can capture the structure of „leadership networks‟ of civic associational community more correctly. 
